In offering the British perspective on the Treaty of Gent, a historian must first acknowledge the stark truth that the Peace of Gent and the preceding War of 1812 find little place in the British historical consciousness. Indeed, in a recent study of British foreign policy in the nineteenth century, neither the War nor the Peace are mentioned at all 1 • Even the ancient and beautiful city of Gent itself lives in British popular imagination as the romantic, somewhat indistinct source of unstated but decidedly "good news" conveyed on horse-back during battles waged many hundreds of years ago. I refer, of course, to Robert Browning's well-loved ballad or "dramatic lyric", reputedly set in more than 800 musical versions: "How they Brought the Good News from Ghent to Aix 2 • Mention 1812 or 1814 in British company and the responses will most likely be to the grande armee and the Retreat from Moscow; to Napoleon and Tchaikovsky. Collectively our British memories are not of the defeat at Plattsburg or even the victory at Bladensburg, though they may stretch to New Orleans, the bombardment of Fort McHenry, the Star-Spangled Banner and the destruction of Washington. Pub-signs, those problematical indicators of folk-history, commemorate Waterloo and Wellington -not the engagements and commanders in the Chesapeake and on Lakes Champlain, Erie and Ontario.
These qualifications are not meant to devalue popular history but rather to make the simple point that the War of 1812 and the Peace of Gent meant and mean different things to contemporaries on either side of the Atlantic and to historians and policy-makers of a later date. Since other contributors have examined the immediate national detail and general international context of the war and subsequent peace between the Americans and the British, the following pages will attempt to assess the significance of the Treaty of Gent in Anglo-American relations from the War for Independence until our own times First we need to remember the origins of the War of 1812. To adopt an old distinction, there were both the immediate and long-term grievances on the American side. The most important of the immediate grievances were the violations of neutral rights as the Royal Navy sought to ~reak Napoleon's autarkic "continental system", in particular by the impressment or forced conscription of alleged British subjects from American vessels to man His Majesty's ships of war. In other words, maritime rights were the most explosive issue between the would-be neutral, the United States, and the desperate belligerent; and the British government would not concede on these rights because they were seen as vital to defeating the land-based enemy of F ranee and her allies. But these immediate controversies simply, if dangerously, exacerbated existing American resentments over the security and limits of the Canadian border, the fears and reality of Indian attacks, and the British restrictions on acces to the fisheries of the North East and the trade of the Caribbean colonies. All these issues had been the subject of the negotiations leading to Jay's Treaty in 1794 (the Anglo-American Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation); and critics of that Treaty now felt vindicated a second time in their charges that the Federalists had conceded to the old enemy for narrow ideological reasons and short-term commercial and financial gain 4 • Then there were the less publicized causes of car. Chief among these was the desire in the northern States of the Union to acquire territory (rather than simple rights) in the Canadian colonies-a desire matched in the South and West by land-hunger towards the Floridas and beyond the line of the Louisiana Purchase (1803) in the area that became known as the Oregon territory, as well as on the other side of the Red River in the lands that were to form the Republic of Mexico 5 • Innumerable pages have been written on the military and naval campaigns of the War of 1812 6 • From them we can see that the war ended not so much in a draw as in stalemate; for the forces on either side were not equally matched but rather incomparable.
The British, especially after 1814, were superior on the high seas, while the Americans were superior on land and the inland waters. But there were no allies for the Americans to use to tip the balance against the British, as there had been in the War for Independence (1776-1783). There was, it was plain to see, a marked parallel with the contemporaneous struggle in Europe and over Europe, which the British saw centred on the struggle with France and which would be won only when the rest of the maritime and The long-term lessons of this European strategic asymmetry emerged over many generations 7 • But is was not many months before the war called for in June 1812 by President James Madison ("Mr Madison's War") was on the path to a negotiated settlement 8 • Tsar Alexander I, worried about the strenght of an ally and the source of his own military funds, and also eager to dent British doctrine and practice on maritime rights, offered mediation. But what ultimately produced negotiations between the British and the Americans was the common realization that victory over the other was impossible. Ex-President Thomas Jefferson was only one American to voice the perception that the defeat of Napoleon, "a great blessing for Europe", threatened "misfortune" for the United States.
Conversely, the outstanding British general, the Duke of Wellington, his prestige and influence enormous even before Waterloo and set to assume the North American command, appreciated that the chances of out-right victory in the American theatre and the human and financial costs of the attempt made continuation of the war both stupid and wasteful 9 of 1812 itself, were a "sideshow". Secondly, and perhaps more to the point of the comparison, the British delegates were essentially that, delegates, rather than plenipotentiaries. In other words, they were meant to take their orders from nearby London; whereas the Americans, thousands of miles and many weeks removed from Washington, simply had to be able to negotiate with the confidence of Madison's administration. Finally, for all their objective abilities, the Americans were not noticeably able to satisfy the demands which had ostensibly led their country to declare war. Indeed, even more so than on the question of the quality of the American delegation, there is widespread agreement that there has rarely been a peace treaty which so signally failed to address the reasons adduced for the fighting of a war We have seen that Wellington was opposed to continuing the War of 1812: the human and economic costs would be enormous; success would not be certain. Castlereagh was equally opposed; and it was he who formulated the theoretical reasons for a negotiated peace . So long as Great Bri- tain was fighting in North America, it was vulnerable in Europa. Primarily for simple military reasons but also for more fundamental diplomatic principles, Britain's interests required a "balance of power" or "just equilibrium" in Europe; and the delicate task of constructing and maintaining such a balance would be difficult, if not impossible, while the United States remained an enemy. Once engaged in a war in either Europe or America, Britain had enemies at her back. Put, therefore, in the simplest terms: peace in Europe required peace in North America. (The third element in Castlereagh's diplomatic triad was the independence and military ineffectiveness of the Lowlands, i.e. British control of the North Sea and its eastern shores: hence, first, the enlargement of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; and then, after his death, British commitment to the formal independence and neutrality of the new Belgium).
Canning, Foreign Secretary from 1822-1827, tried something more elaborate still; and his policy too consisted of three elements. One part was the use of the newly-independent States of South and Central America as make-weights against the dangers of the Holy Alliance, which had become the latest and immediate threat to the balance of power in Europe; another was to side with the United States in opposing any projection of continental European power into the Americas; and the third was to oust the U nited States from the role of self-proclaimed protector of the liberties of Monroe's "Southern brethren" 15 • Canning's elaborate scheme did not hold. Castlereagh's simpler policy worked, at least in its American elements; and the rest of this paper will trace in broad outlines the history of that success.
If (as is widely acknowledged) the Treaty of Gent failed by its own terms to resolve most of the problems which had brought on the War of 1812, it did nevertheless provide the means and methods of resolving such controversies in the future. Moreover, the simple fact of peace removed the most immediate casus belli, the British violations of neutral, maritime rights through impressment, blockades, and searches and seizures by the Royal Navy. Such violations and the counter-claims of the British were ignored in the eleven articles of the Treaty; but then in a state of peace between the two countries, these issues were no longer dangerously controversial. On boundaries and territorial disputes, the Peace laid down detailed provisions for the appointment of joint "commissioners", who in the event of disagreement, could refer to a third party "friendly Sovereign or State". So was established the double Anglo-American tradition of the peaceful settlement of borders and of third-party arbitration in case of disagreement between the principals.
The first stage in the peaceful resolution of contentious issues came with the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817, limiting the British and American naval forces in the Great Lakes region, to be followed immediately by the Beyond truncated Mexico lay the small republics of the Central American isthmus; and here we have a good measure of the advance of the U nited States and the retreat of Britain. In 1850 the two governments negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which placed any future interoceanic canal under joint American-British control. A classic case of imperialism, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty also represented a diplomatic, economic and military equilibrium between the two empires in the Caribbean, at precisely the moment when historians judge the British Empire to have been at its global height. In 1901 this treaty was superseded by the (2nd) Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which with supplementary terms registered the British concession of exclusive rights to the Americans to build, protect and control an isthmian canal. (Two years later, President Theodore Roo-41 sevelt helped Panama to "independence" and began constructing the canal in earnest) 16 • One quite definite provision of the Treaty of Gent tends to be forgotten. Article X committed the signatories to end the "traffic in slaves". It was, in truth, a provision "more honoured in the breech than in the observance", as slavery became the divisive and decisive issue in American politics for the next half century. In 1841 the Quintuple Treaty between France, Austria, Russia, Prussia and Great Britain afforded reciprocal rights to the five Powers to stop and search vessels for slaves; and this new "Holy Alliance" (in the phrase of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen) posed the risk of a serious clash between the two major Atlantic naval States, whose relations (it has been said) were "poisoned for years" by international adhorrence of the slave-trade
•
The American Civil War, whose basic cause was the institution of slavery, produced deep splits in British society. The government of Lord Palmerston was sympathetic to the Southern secession; while much of the working-class and the liberal middle-class favoured a Northern victory. Such sociological and ideological divisions are a reminder that in speaking of Anglo-American relations and patterns of governmental behaviour we are dealing in the broadest categories. Furthermore, in America and in the British Isles there was also the ethnic variable. Particularly after the Famine and the Great Migration from Ireland in the 1840s-1850s it becomes increasingly problematical to speak of "British" and "American" attitudes. Nor do the ethnic and wider sociological variations cease with the recognition of the "Irish question" in American politics. After the Irish came the Germans; after them followed the "new immigration" of the late nineteenth-early twentieth century; and as the population-mix of the U nited States changed (as did that of Canada), so did the sentimental and familial ties of governments and elites accross the Atlantic. However, as we can easily see, there was no simple correlation, let alone direct causal connection between these demographic factors and political behaviour. After all, the two Anglo-American wars had been fought when the ties of kinship were closest between the two belligerents.
In the history of Anglo-American relations the Civil War will generally be remembered for the exploits of the C.S.S. Alabama, a Confederate raider, which accounted for the loss of dozens of Union ships (totalling some 100,000 tons), until finally sunk off Cherbourg at the time Sherman was marching from Tennessee into Georgia Qune 1864). The outrage caused in the North led to demands for millions-even billions-of dollars in compensation from the British; and the resulting Treaty of Washington (1871), with its provisions for the arbitration inter alia of these claims and the final having its intellectual base in the policies constructed by Castlereagh at the time of the War of 1812 and the subsequent Treaty of Gent. For it was then that (as one scholar wrote) "the doctrine of continuity in the conduct of Foreign Affairs [was] brought to birth". As Castlereagh's leading biographer, the diplomatic historian Charles Webster rightly noted: [Castlereagh] saw from the first the fundamental fact that more friendly relations between the two nations was of far more importance to Britain than any brilliant diplomatic triumph ... and [consequently] handled affairs never to offend the susceptibilities of the United States.
In Castlereagh's own words, as he commented on his policy to the American Minister in London, Richard Rush: it was of less moment which of the parties [the British or the Americans] gained a little more or lost a little more ... than that controversies should be adjusted, and the harmony of the two countries ... be made secure
Historians of British foreign policy are aware that fellow Britons as well as continentals have alleged that the "Anglo-Saxons" and the British in particular have an aversion to systematic theorizing when it comes to diplomacy 24 • The record of Anglo-American relations scarcely supports this generalization. On the contrary, the paradox of British diplomacy lies in the skill with which practitioners claim to act ad hoc while yet displaying powerful lines of tradition. As we have seen, this basic pattern is not disproved by the obvious examples of vigorous, competitive, even belligerent rhetoric. The simple point is that successive British governments did not allow these tensions to break out into hostilities. Recent sholarship on the interwar and early post-war years clearly testifies to the deep divisions and some real antagonisms between London and Washington: over the Anglo-Japanese alliance, naval armaments, imperial preferences, the roles of the City and Wall Street, oil sources-and much more 25 • But the inescapable fact is that whenever the British were and have been seriously at odds with the Americans, the British have eventually fallen into line. From the Caribbean at the turn of the century to Suez in the mid Fifties and up to our own day, this has been the pattern of Anglo-American relationsa pattern set essentially 175 years ago. So far from the Americans enjoying the "free security" afforded by the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century, it has been the British, with their territorial and commercial interests in States before the formal unification of Germany, East and West). Thatcher's language was allusive but its substance was surely unmistakable. In both her economic and political formulations she was invoking a Europe which Britain could manipulate through ad hoc combinations. Here is the politico-diplomatic formulation: "We shall always look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great European cities". Added to the old principle of "divide and rule" we see the notion of increasing the State actors to multiply the potential countervailing combinations -a latter-day version of the pluralism to be found in James Madison's contribution to the Federalist Papers. Then there comes the politico-economic formulation:
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in · Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.
As we have seen, to play this role of balancer, British governments have for nearly two centuries looked to a secure, peaceful relationship with the United States. Consequently Thatcher set her vision of the new Europe within rather than alongside or as an alternative to the "special relationship" with the United States. But the language of the "special relationship" (so redolent of the British detachment despised by leaders like de Gaulle) was at Brugge modulated into the language of the Cold War. In Thatcher's eyes, the European Community should be part of that Atlantic Community -that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic-which is our greatest inheritance and our greatest strength. Admirers as well as critics of Margaret Thatcher comment on the "populist", "instinctive", even "visceral" nature of her politics at home and abroad 28 • In fact we can see that there is something else at work here: her acceptance of two traditional themes in British diplomatic practice. One is the continuing desire to play the role of arbiter of European affairs; the other is the belief that such a role can be played only by maintaining a privileged relationship with the United States. The contemporary evidence suggests that while the former may be possible, it can no longer be premised on a specially favourable relationship with the United States. The contemporary evidence suggests that while the former may be possible, it can no longer be premised on a specially favourable relationship with the U nited States. Certainly the record of Thatcher's tenure in office is of deference to the United States; but there is little sign of reciprocity. It might be tempting to think that a different political party in government in the United Kingdom would produce a change in attitudes towards Europe, both the Europe of the Community and the wider Europe. But the signs are that even the Labour Party, the only likely alternative party of government, is busily polishing its pro-American credentials. However, there are also signs that the Labour Party is aiming to present itself as more committed to Europe than the Conservatives 29 • Perhaps the suspicion American administrations traditionally feel towards the Labour Party will work to the advantage of a European policy: with little sympathy for them in Washington, perhaps a Labour administration in London would indeed embrace a social democratic Europe -if only by default? At the conclusion of the negotiations in Gent, John Quincy Adams uttered a few words which have since become famous:
I hope that the doors of the temple of Janus, closed here at Ghent, shall not be opened for the next century.
As an expression of hope for peace between the United States and Great Britain, Adam's words came true-and for much longer that anyone might have reasonably predicted. Janus, the most ancient of the Roman gods, symbolizes a vision of the past and our outlook on the future, pivoted like doors to be opened or closed towards progress or reaction. For one British historian there remain three abiding and co-mingled memories of Gent during the celebrations commemorating the Anglo-American Peace. One is of the generosity and warmth of the townspeople whose ancestors were hosts to the American and British delegates in 1814--the openness of the people of Gent towards strangers and guests. The second, deeply affecting impression is of the psychiatric hospital, Psychiatrisch Centrum Sint-J an De Deo, once the site of the peace-signing and now made into an open community for its dwellers, not an institution closed off from the outer world. And the third memory is of being at Gent when Europe, West and East, was opening itself to itself across the barriers of the Cold War. Perhaps it is reasonable for us to hope that in symbolically reclosing the doors of Janus, we can in reality open up new possibilities beyond Gent; and that this will indeed be its "good news" in the years to come.
